Canonical Term‐Structure Models with Observable Factors and the Dynamics of Bond Risk Premia

We derive a canonical representation for the no‐arbitrage discrete‐time term structure models with both observable and unobservable state variables, popularized by Ang and Piazzesi (2003) . We conduct a specification analysis based on this canonical representation and we analyze how alternative parameterizations affect estimated risk premia, impulse response functions, and variance decompositions. We find a trade‐off between the need to obtain parsimonious parameterizations and the ability of the models to match observed patterns of variation in risk premia. We also find that more richly parameterized models uncover a greater influence of macroeconomic fundamentals on the long‐end of the yield curve.     

Information Sharing in Credit Markets

We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market, and to advances in information technology; such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants. In addition, information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market. These predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market.     

Learning,Monetary Policy,and Asset Prices

We explore the stability properties of interest rate rules granting an explicit response to stock prices in a New Keynesian DSGE model where the presence of non‐Ricardian households makes stock prices nonredundant for the business cycle. We find that responding to stock prices enlarges the policy space for which the equilibrium is both determinate and E‐stable (learnable). In particular, the Taylor principle ceases to be necessary, and determinacy/E‐stability is granted also by mildly passive policy rules. Our results appear to be more prominent in economies featuring a lower elasticity of substitution across differentiated products and/or more rigid labor markets.     

HOW LARGE IS THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AFRICA? EVIDENCE FROM NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND LABOUR MARKETS

In recent years, the private sector has been recognised as a key engine of Africa's economic development. Yet, very little is known about its size and characteristics. We present novel estimates for 50 African countries and show that the private sector accounts for about two thirds of total investments, four fifths of total consumption and three fourths of total credit. Countries with small private sectors include a sample of oil exporters and some of the poorest countries in the continent. Surprisingly, the size of the private sector does not appear to be significantly correlated with growth performance. Labour market data reinforce the idea of a large private sector, which provides about 90% of total employment opportunities. However, most of this labour is informal and characterised by low productivity: permanent wage jobs in the private sector account on average for only 10% of total employment. South Africa is the notable exception, with formal wage employment in the private sector representing 46% of total employment. Finally, we find evidence of negative private sector earning premiums (?13% on the average), suggesting that market distortions abound. These are likely to prevent the efficient allocation of human resources and to reduce the overall productivity of the African economies.     

ARE DISADVANTEGED BIDDERS DOOMED IN ASCENDING AUCTIONS?

A bidder is said to be advantaged if she has a higher expected valuation of the auction prize than her competitor. When the prize has a common‐value component, a bidder competing in an ascending auction against an advantaged competitor bids especially cautiously and, hence, the advantaged bidder wins most of the time. However, contrary to what is often argued, a disadvantaged bidder still wins with positive probability, even if his competitor's advantage is very large and even if the disadvantaged bidder has the lowest actual valuation ex‐post. Therefore, the disadvantaged bidder has an incentive to participate in the auction, and the presence of a bidder with a small advantage does not have a dramatic effect on the seller's revenue.     

Short‐Selling Bans Around the World: Evidence from the 2007–09 Crisis

Most regulators around the world reacted to the 2007–09 crisis by imposing bans on short selling. These were imposed and lifted at different dates in different countries, often targeted different sets of stocks, and featured varying degrees of stringency. We exploit this variation in short‐sales regimes to identify their effects on liquidity, price discovery, and stock prices. Using panel and matching techniques, we find that bans (i) were detrimental for liquidity, especially for stocks with small capitalization and no listed options; (ii) slowed price discovery, especially in bear markets, and (iii) failed to support prices, except possibly for U.S. financial stocks.     

An Experiment on Retail Payments Systems

We develop a novel theoretical and experimental framework to study adoption and use of cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. The design allows us to assess the behavioral impact of sellers' service fees and buyers' rewards from using electronic payments. In the experiment, buyers and sellers faced a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments but buyers did not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly increased adoption and use of electronic payments. Buyers' economic incentives were crucial for the diffusion of electronic payments but cannot fully explain their adoption choices.     

Local Experiences,Search, and Spillovers in the Housing Market

Recent local price growth explains differences in search behavior across prospective homebuyers. Those experiencing higher growth in their postcode of residence search more broadly across locations and house characteristics, without changing attention devoted to individual sales listings, and have shorter search duration. Effects are stronger for homeowners, in particular those living in less wealthy areas and looking for a new primary residence. We use reduced-form analysis and a quantitative equilibrium model to show that the expansion of search breadth translates into widespread spillovers onto house sales prices and inventories of listings across postcodes within a metropolitan area.